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Abstract
This paper builds a banking DSGE model based on endogenous loan to value
ratios, taking the different relationship between different types of enterprises
and banks into account. Due to the political connections between the bank
and enterprises, loan to value ratio for favored enterprises (e.g. state-owned
enterprises) is endogenously higher than that for non-favored enterprises (e.g.
private enterprises), which is called discriminatory credit constraint in this paper.
Compared to non-discriminatory credit constraint, we find that discriminatory
credit constraint can further amplify the impact of negative technology shocks on
output, and reduce the effectiveness of expansionary monetary policy. Empirical
evidence from China industrial firms’ data supports our conclusion.
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1 Introdcution
In the fourth quarter of 2008, affected by the US subprime mortgage crisis,
China suffered a drop in total imports and exports, and a fall in GDP growth
rate (see Figure 1). In order to resist the adverse influence of the financial
crisis on China’s economy, the Chinese government decisively launched the “four
trillion” rescue plan, and simultaneous expansionary monetary policy (see Figure
2). These expansionary policies allowed China’s economy to maintain an annual
GDP growth rate of 10% in the period 2009-2011; however, subsequently, China’s
economic growth has declined. Some Chinese scholars (e.g. Lin, 2013) , explain
this situation by pointing out that China’s economic slowdown is cyclical, as the
global economy has still not recovered; while others (e.g. Y. Li, 2013) believe that
China’s economy is facing a structural slowdown due to the economic structural
imbalance caused by the extensive economic growth of the past. Meanwhile, Le
et al. (2014) argue that although the rescue policy may have offset the impact of
the financial crisis to some extent, it has only been deferred, and will probably
erupt again. In response to this controversial issue, this paper attempts to put
forward some new answers. It argues that credit structure imbalance caused
by differential treatment of Chinese state-owned enterprises (henceforth, SOEs)
and private enterprises (henceforth, PEs) in the credit markets plays an essential
role in amplifying the impact of negative technology shock on the economy, and
weakens the effectiveness of monetary policy, therefore leading to continuous
economic slowdown.
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
China’s economic growth has long relied on government-led investment. State-
ownership has always been one of the most important engines to promote eco-
nomic growth. Despite the reforms that began in 1978, and which have had a
major impact on all aspects of the Chinese economy, SOEs and PEs are still
subject to different treatment. Compared with PEs, SOEs attract much greater
government support and protection, and enjoy access to more resources, tax re-
ductions, and looser financing conditions (Dollar & Wei, 2007; Song et al., 2011).
In China, the financing of PEs has become a major problem in recent years, thus
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confirming the existence of unfair treatment in the credit market. In this paper,
we refer to this situation as discriminatory credit constraint. According to the
existing literature (Kiyotaki & Moore, 2012; Iacoviello, 2005), one measure of
the extent of credit constraint is loan to value ratio (henceforth, LTV ratio).1 In
Figure 3 we compare average LTV ratios of Chinese state-owned industrial enter-
prises and private industrial enterprises in China from 2004 to 2011. In general,
the LTV ratio of state-owned firms is notably higher than that of private firms.
We see a particular increase in the ratio of state-owned firms from 2008, when
the financial crisis occurred. Figure 4 describes the relationship between LTV
ratios and economic growth. We find that the LTV ratio of PEs is pro-cyclical
while that of SOEs is counter-cyclical. The figures reveal that discriminatory
credit constraint does indeed exist, and has been particularly serious since 2008.
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE
How does discriminatory credit constraint affect the running of the macro-
economy? How does it influence the business cycle? Whether or not it is the
driver behind the continuous decline of China’s economy, in the absence of exist-
ing research on the issue, this paper attempts to find answers to these questions.
We extend the model of Gerali et al. (2010) (henceforth, GNSS) by introducing
a monitor cost to work out the formation endogenously, and evolve the mecha-
nism of the loan to value ratio, incorporating two types of enterprise (SOE and
PE) to describe the discriminatory credit constraint they confront. Based on
the impulse response results, we find that the discriminatory credit constraint
may amplify the impact of technology shocks and reduce the effectiveness of
monetary policy. Furthermore, we construct regression models to examine the
moderate effect of discriminatory credit constraint. Using China industry-level
data from 1999 to 2008 in the estimation, the results support our conclusion
from the model analysis.
1LTV ratio is equal to the amount of a loan divided by the value of collateral or of an asset
purchased. The ratio is decided through negotiation between the bank and the enterprise, and reflects
the banks’ behaviour of resisting risks. Because loan of an enterprise is almost equal to long-term
debt in the balance sheet, we use long-term debt divided by fixed assets as the proxy variable of LTV
ratio. Sometimes, for simplification, we can also use the ratio of long-term debt divided by total assets
to check the trend of LTV ratio.
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The marginal contribution of this paper is as follows. First, we find a new
“financial accelerator” discriminatory credit constraint between different types
of enterprises, which can accelerate economic fluctuation. Secondly, we find that
this “financial accelerator” may also hinder the effectiveness of monetary policy.
Thirdly, with regard to modelling, this paper proposes a pioneering model that
leaves LTV ratios endogenous, which may be used by further research on credit
constraint problems.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a
review of related literature. Section 3 introduces the full DSGE model, while
Section 4 describes the calibration of the model. Sections 5 and 6 present the
impulse response analysis and empirical analysis respectively. Section 7 com-
prises concluding remarks.
2 Related Literature
2.1 Financial Misallocation
An increasing number of scholars are focusing on the issue of resources misal-
location, an important problem in many countries. Some researchers believe
that micro-level resource misallocation can obstruct the growth of total-factor
productivity (TFP), thus hindering economic growth, especially in developing
countries (Gancia & Zilibotti, 2009; Hsieh & Klenow, 2009; Bartelsman et al.,
2013). Finance raised through loans and equity markets, an essential type of
resource, is also frequently misallocated, thus motivating further research in this
area. Some scholars propose that financial friction may induce misallocation and
TFP losses (Gilchrist et al., 2013; Midrigan & Xu, 2010); moreover, the impact
is determined by the persistence of technology shock (Moll, 2014).
Financial resources misallocation is relatively severe in China, in particular
between SOEs and PEs. Strong intervention by the Chinese government makes
the allocation of loan resources biased towards SOEs, rather than PEs (Brandt
& Li, 2003; H. Li et al., 2008; Cull et al., 2009; Gordon & Li, 2011). Song et
al. (2011) argue that a reallocation of resources could address China’s serious
inefficiency and lead to fast growth over a prolonged transition. However, others
maintain that financial distortion cannot be an impediment to China’s economic
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growth (Guariglia & Poncet, 2008). Some researchers explain the credit misal-
location in China as due to political connections between government and firms.
Because of incentives for promotion, local government officials may force the
banks to provide more loans to SOEs, which may bring fiscal revenue (Gordon
& Li, 2011). This situation is also found in other emerging countries, such as
Brazil, where the government can control banks to increase loans, influencing
firms’ strategy for the purpose of improving employment in certain politically
important regions (Carvalho, 2014). Cull et al. (2013) contribute to this topic
by empirically testing the relationships among investment behaviour of SOEs,
political connections and financial constraint, proving that credit misallocation
in China is indeed the result of political connections.
This paper accepts the existence of credit misallocation, and agrees that
it can be explained by political connections. However, contrary to the papers
mentioned above, we argue that a more direct cause is the unfair financial friction
between SOEs and PEs, which is itself caused by political connections between
SOEs and government. As a main type of unfair financial friction, discriminatory
credit constraint may lead to financial resources flowing to inefficient places, thus
affecting the running of the macro-economy and the business cycle. This paper
constructs a banking DSGE model to research how this discriminatory credit
constraint influences the transmission of primary shocks, such as technology
shock and monetary policy shock.
2.2 Financial Friction and Banking DSGE models
Before the US subprime crisis, the DSGE model under financial friction did not
incorporate an obvious and detailed banking sector. Most studies developed
models based on the collateral constraint model of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),
or financial accelerator model of Bernanke et al. (1999). They concentrated on
the friction of the demand side in the financial sector. The dynamic relationship
between financial position of the enterprise, financing demand, and the financial
cost, which drives the business cycle, is specifically described. Since the financial
crisis, an increasing number of scholars have paid attention to the banking sector,
as it is the supply side of financial activity. This sector was the first and most
seriously damaged by the financial shocks suffered as a result of the crisis, and
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many economists have proposed that it is an important factor in amplifying the
influence of shocks on the real economic fluctuation.
Three main types of approach to introduce the banking sector into the DSGE
model have been proposed. These models, by Gerali et al. (2010), Dib (2010)
and Gertler and Karadi (2011), all reflect the influence of the banking sector by
modelling the forming mechanism of loan interest. The first two concentrate on
banks’ balance sheet and consider banks’ monopoly competition leading to inter-
est rate mark-up and rigidity. The third, by Gertler and Karadi (2011), models
the banking sector by solving a canonical agency problem between household
and banker. For the purpose of preventing the banker’s corruption, an incentive
compatibility constraint is set for bankers, from which the authors derive an
endogenous leverage ratio and loan interest. These three models have also been
widely extended. Some scholars extend GNSS to a small open economy and con-
sider international capital flow (Ajevskis & Vitola, 2011; Kamber & Thoenissen,
2011). Others add liquidity requirement to the banking sector (Roger & Vlcˇek,
2011; Dellas et al., 2013).
Scholars have also begun to analyse the role of the banking sector in the
Chinese business cycle using DSGE models. Le et al. (2014) build a DSGE
model based on Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007), combined with the financial
accelerator mechanism of Bernanke et al. (1999). They argue that as a result
of government intervention, China was relatively unscathed during the world
crisis. They point in particular to the fact that the government requested the
state-owned banks to support state-owned firms. However, their model does
not distinguish between state-owned banks and private banks, or between state-
owned firms and private firms. Xu and Chen (2009) introduce a bank sector to
the canonical DSGE model. Through the comparison of simulated data and real
data, they find that credit shocks have good ability in explaining the Chinese
business cycle. Yan (2012) develops a DSGE model including a bank sector to
prove that the effect of macroeconomic shocks on output is negatively related
to the interest spread of that banking sector. Kang et al. (2013) extend Gertler
and Karadi (2011) to a two-industry DSGE model, and find that the banking
sector is the bridge across which exogenous shocks are transmitted between two
industries. Wang and Tian (2014) use China’s data to test Jermann and Quadrini
(2009)’s model to fit Chinese data. Their result shows that financial shock is the
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most important factor driving the Chinese business cycle, and can explain more
than 80% of the Chinese economy volatility.
Recent literature on financial shocks, bank sector and Chinese business cycle
contributes to identifying the role of the banking sector in economic volatility,
but there remain two aspects that deserve further discussion. Existing literature
cannot clearly explain the mechanism whereby the banking sector amplifies the
shocks, and to date no study has incorporated the two different kinds of firms
into the model. As mentioned in Le et al. (2014), intervention by government
forced the state-owned banks to financially support state-owned firms during
the period of global financial crisis, leading to a Chinese credit boom in the
following period and causing surplus productivity in manufacturing, stimulating
the deferred bank crisis to explode.
3 Full Model
In this section, we extend the GNSS model by distinguishing two types of enter-
prise: state-owned enterprises and private enterprises. We attempt to describe
the discriminatory credit constraint confronted by state-owned firms and private
firms, and calibrate its impacts on the economy when exogenous shocks occur.
As Figure 5 shows, the whole economy incorporates patient and impatient house-
holds, wholesale banks, bank lending and bank deposit branches, SOEs and PEs,
retailers, capital goods producers and a central bank. The blue line describes
the cash flow of bank money including the deposits from patient households,
wholesale loans issued by wholesale banks, and loans to impatient households,
SOEs and PEs with different LTV ratios. All the LTV ratios should be decided
by wholesale banks, who also undertake the default cost (CSV cost). We assume
the LTV ratio for impatient households is constant, while that for enterprises is
time-varied. Considering that the banks in China will provide less strict loan
conditions to SOEs because of their strong government background, we assume
that the government will pay subsidies to wholesale banks, which are directly
connected to the loan amount supporting SOEs (as the blue dashed line shows
in Figure 5).
FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE
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3.1 Households
3.1.1 Patient Households
Following GNSS, the representative of patient households maximizes its whole-
life expected utilities:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtP
(1− aP ) log (cPt − aP c˜Pt−1)+ log hPt −
(
nP,At
)1+φA
1 + φA
−
(
nP,Bt
)1+φB
1 + φB

(1)
where, cPt is the consumption, a
P is the parameter to measure the consumption
habit, hPt is housing, n
P,A
t and n
P,B
t are the hours worked in the state-owned firms
(Firm A) and private firms (Firm B) respectively, which have inverse Fischer
elasticity φA and φB. The representative patient household earns a wage with a
real wage rate wP,At of state-owned firms and w
P,B
t of private firms to support
their consumption and accumulation of housing ∆hPt with housing price q
h
t . The
budget constraint is:
cPt + d
P
t + q
h
t ∆h
P
t ≤ wP,At nP,At + wP,Bt nP,Bt +
dPt−1
(
1 + rdt−1
)
pit
+ tPt (2)
where dPt is the deposit, r
d
t−1 is the net deposit interest rate of t− 1 period, and
tPt is lump-sum taxes and dividends.
3.1.2 Impatient Households
Similarly, the impatient households also choose the labour supply, consumption
and housing investment to maximize their expected utilities as:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtI
(1− aI) log (cIt − aI c˜It−1)+ log hIt −
(
nI,At
)1+φA
1 + φA
−
(
nI,Bt
)1+φB
1 + φB

(3)
and subject to:
cIt +
bIt−1
(
1 + rbHt−1
)
pit
+ qht ∆h
I
t ≤ wI,At nI,At + wI,Bt nI,Bt + bIt (4)
where bIt is the money borrowed from banks with a net loan interest r
bH . The
households should provide their housing as collateral, so they confront a borrow-
ing constraint set by banks
bIt
(
1 + rbHt
)
≤ mHEt
[
qht+1h
I
tpit+1
]
(5)
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That means the total amount of loan and interest should be less than the ex-
pected value of housing multiplied by loan to value ratio mH .
3.2 Enterprises
In this model, we incorporate two types of enterprise, state-owned enterprises
and private enterprises, indexed as s = A,B respectively. We intend to describe
the different efficiency of state-owned and private enterprises, and to analyse the
different financial friction they confront. In common with most standard set-ups,
the representative enterprise selects the labour, capital, consumption and loans
to maximize its whole-life utility of consumption cst .
E0
∞∑
t=0
βts (1− as) log
(
cst − aI c˜st−1
)
(6)
where, betas is the subjective discount factor of enterprise s, and a
s is the con-
sumption habit parameter.
3.2.1 State-owned Enterprises
The production function of state-owned enterprises is like Cobb-Douglas tech-
nology
yAt = zt
(
uAt k
A
t−1
)αA (
nAt
)1−αA
(7)
where, kAt−1 is the capital, nAt is hours worked, zt is technology shocks , and ut
is time-varying utilization rate of capital (See Schmitt-Grohe´ & Uribe, 2006),
which leads to a cost:
ψ
(
uAt
)
kAt−1 = k
A
t−1
(
κu1
2
(
uAt − u¯At
)2 − κu2 (uAt − u¯At ))
where κu1 and κ
u
2 are positive parameters, which measure the cost of improvement
of capital utilization. Utilization rate of capital reflects the capacity. If the
utilization rate decreases, the firm can be regarded as having excess capacity.
The labour nAt is aggregated from patient labour and impatient labour by C-D
technology with parameter µn :
nAt =
(
nI,At
)µn (
nP,At
)1−µn
(8)
The state-owned enterprises earn revenue by selling their products. Their
main expenditure consists of purchasing capital goods to invest, paying wages
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and their own consumption. They can borrow money from banks to help them
start the business and smooth the consumption. Then we can write the budget
constraint as follows:
yAt
xAt
+ bAt + q
k
t (1− δ) kAt−1 = qkt kAt + ψ
(
uAt
)
kAt−1 + w
P,A
t n
P,A
t + w
I,A
t n
I,A
t
+cAt +
bAt−1
(
1 + rbEt−1
)
pit
(9)
where, δ is the depreciation rate of capital, qkt and 1/x
A
t are the relative price
of state-owned enterprise-made products and capital goods compared to con-
sumption goods price, bAt is the amount of borrowed money, r
bE
t is the net loan
interest for enterprises, wP,At and w
I,A
t are real wage rates for patient households
and impatient households respectively.
In order to introduce the endogenous law of evolution for loan to value ratio,
we construct a scenario to show the loan default and information asymmetry. We
assume the project has probability to succeed of 1− η , and then the enterprise
will return the total loan payable to banks including the interest. However, there
is η probability that the project may fail. If the project fails, both the enterprise
and the banks will incur a cost. The enterprises are not willing to return the
total debt, so loan default occurs. The bank will pay a cost for ”Costly State
Verification” (CSV, mentioned in BGG, 1999), which is assumed to be positively
related to loan to value ratio and the total loan and interest payable (mAt−1/2κf
multiplied by total debt). For enterprises, the loan payable is diminished, so they
only return 1 −mAt−1/2κf to the bank. This is a threshold value: if the return
rate is less than the threshold, the bank will pay CSV cost to hire a person to
recoup the loan payable. However, the enterprise should also incur the total cost
of project failure. We assume the project failure cost is κfm
A
t−1qkt kAt−1, which is
positively related to the loan to value ratio and capital. This is because when
the LTV ratio is relatively higher, the enterprise will have higher leverage and
will be motivated to invest in more risky projects, which will lead to more loss
when the project fails.
Then we can aggregate the budget constraint of enterprises under two differ-
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ent conditions by weight of their probabilities, 1− η and η respectively:
yAt
xAt
+ bAt + q
k
t (1− δ) kAt−1 = qkt kAt + ψ
(
uAt
)
kAt−1 + w
P,A
t n
P,A
t + w
I,A
t n
I,A
t + c
A
t
+
bAt−1
(
1 + rbEt−1
)
pit
(
1− ηm
A
t−1
2κf
)
+ κfm
A
t−1q
k
t k
A
t−1
(10)
The firm also confronts borrowing constraint set by banks
bAt
(
1 + rbEt
)
≤ mAt Et
[
qkt+1k
A
t pit+1 (1− δ)
]
(11)
In our model, we assume the loan to value ratio is endogenous, which means
the loan to value ratio depends on the negotiation of banks and enterprises.
However, state-owned enterprises have more power in the loan market, so we
assume that only state-owned enterprises and banks can make a decision about
loan to value ratio.
3.2.2 Private Enterprises
Following Song et al. (2011) we assume the private enterprises can hire man-
agers with remuneration wmt to improve their labor efficiency by χ. Then the
production function of private firm is:
yBt = zt (1− ψ)
(
uBt k
B
t−1
)αB (
χnBt
)1−αB
(12)
Meanwhile, to prevent the manager diverting funds from the company to their
own benefit, the remuneration satisfies an incentive constraint wmt > ψy
B
t , where
ψ is the parameter satisfying an assumption χ > (1− ψ)−
1
1−αB proved by Song
et al. (2011) to keep the firm willing to hire a manager. Similarly to state-owned
enterprises, we can write the budget constraint of private enterprises as
yBt
xBt
+ bAt + q
k
t (1− δ) kBt−1 = qkt kBt + ψ
(
uAt
)
kBt−1 + w
P,B
t n
P,B
t + w
I,B
t n
I,B
t + c
B
t
+
bBt−1
(
1 + rbEt−1
)
pit
(
1− ηm
B
t−1
2κf
)
+ κfm
B
t−1q
k
t k
B
t−1
3.3 Banking Sector
Following Gerali et al. (2010), the bank sector in our model is also split into three
parts: a wholesale bank and two retailer branches. Unlike Gerali et al. (2010),
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however, we assume the banks know the collateral provided by enterprises, and
will choose LTV ratio to ensure that the borrowing constraint of enterprises is
always binding.
3.3.1 Wholesale Branch
Following GNSS, each wholesale branch operates under perfect competition. On
the liabilities side they will combine their own bank capital kwt with deposit dt
transferred from deposit retail branches on the liabilities side. On the assets side,
they will issue loans bIt to impatient households, and loans b
A
t and b
B
t to state-
own and private enterprises respectively. The law of evolution for bank capital
is pitk
w
t =
(
1− δb) kwt−1 + jbankt−1 , where δb measures resources used to manage the
bank capital, jbankt−1 is profit of total banks.
According to the analysis on the scenario of loan default and information
asymmetry, banks will incur a CSV cost. We assume that all of this cost is
undertaken by wholesale branches, and then they will choose deposit and loans
to maximize their expected profit as follows:
max
mst ,b
s
t ,b
I
t
rwEt
(
bAt + b
B
t
)
+ rwHt b
I
t − rtdt −
κkb
2
(
kwt
bt
− νb
)2
− η
2κw
(
mAt +m
B
t
) (
1 + rbEt
)
+ T
(
bAt
)
where, rwEt , r
wH
t are wholesale loan rate for enterprises and impatient house-
holds respectively, kwt and bt are bank capital and total loan, ν
b is the cap-
ital acquirement ratio set by the regulator, κkb and kappaw are parameters,
T
(
bAt
)
is the subsidy from government 2 for loans to state-owned firms, T
(
bAt
)
=
κT1
2
(
bAt − b¯A
)2
/b¯A + κT2 b
A
t , where κ
T
1 and κ
T
2 are positive parameters. This sub-
sidy is to reflect the tight relations between banks and state-owned enterprises.
As we know, the majority of banks in China are really controlled by govern-
ment, which includes both central government and local government. Then the
leaders and shareholders of state-owned firms may influence the banks to reduce
the loan conditions and requirements. Moreover, motivated by the pursuit of
promotion, officials of local government continuously improve their political per-
formance by exerting pressure on banks and state-owned firms for GDP growth.
Furthermore, when the loans of state-owned firms became non-performing, the
2When closing the model, the cost of this subsidy is finally borne by patient households.
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government helps the banks to strip away bad assets. These phenomena reflect
the strong relations between banks and state-owned enterprises, so we use the
subsidy to reveal this relationship, which is also the main driver of discriminatory
credit constraint between state-owned and private firms.
Following GNSS, we assume the deposit rate faced by the wholesale banks is
equal to Taylor Rule rate rt, which is paid to the deposit retailer. The balance
sheet constraint of wholesale branches is bAt +b
B
t +b
I
t = bt = k
w
t +dt. In addition,
they choose the loan to value ratio under the condition mstq
k
t+1k
s
tpit+1 (1 + δ) =(
1 + rbEt
)
. After some algebra with regard to the first order conditions, we can
derive the interest spread between wholesale loan rates and Taylor Rule rate:
rwHt = rt − κkb
(
kwt
bt
− νb
)(
kwt
bt
)2
(13)
Similar to GNSS, the interest spread comes from the cost of capital acquirement.
Furthermore, we can get the interest spread between wholesale loan rates for
impatient households and private enterprises:
rwEt = r
wH
t + ηm
B
t
1 + rbEt
κw
(14)
This spread reflects the cost of probability of loan default or CSV cost. Mean-
while, we also can derive a similar equation from the first order condition for
loan of state-owned enterprises. Combining them, we can derive the relationship
of loan to value ratios for two types of firms:
mAt −mBt =
T ′
(
bAt
)
κw
η
(
1 + rbEt
) (15)
It is obvious that the extent of discriminatory credit constraint is positively
related to the marginal subsidy rate to banks for SOE loans, and negatively
related to the loan interest rate of enterprises.
3.3.2 Deposit Retailer Branch
The deposit retailer branches operate under monopoly competition. They col-
lect deposits from patient households with deposit rates rdt (i) and transfer the
deposits to the wholesale branch with interest rate rt, equal to the Taylor Rule
rate. According to Benesˇ and Lees (2007), the total deposit market each retailer
confronts is dt =
[∫ 1
0 dt (i)
1/εd
]εd
, where εd is the elasticity of substitution of
deposit. After cost minimization, we can derive the deposit demand of each
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retailer as dt (i) =
[
rdt (i) /r
d
t
]−εd dt. We assume the deposit retailers have a
quadric adjustment cost when adjusting the deposit rate; then we can write the
profit function of deposit retailer branch as:
max
rdt (i)
E0
∞∑
t=0
ΛP0,t
rtdt (i)− rdt (i) dt (i)− κd2
(
rdt (i)
rdt−1 (i)
− 1
)2
rdt dt
 (16)
where, ΛP0,t is random discount factor of patient households, and κd is param-
eter of sticky extent. The first order condition for rdt (i) yield, after imposing
symmetric equilibrium, is:
−1 + εd − εd rt
rd
− κd
(
rdt
rdt−1
− 1
)
rdt
rdt−1
+ βPEt
[
λPt+1
λPt
κd
(
rdt+1
rdt
− 1
)
rdt+1
rdt
dt+1
dt
]
= 0
(17)
In the steady state the deposit interest is rdt =
εd
εd−1rt . Because εd < 0, the
deposit rate is marked down to Taylor rule rate.
3.3.3 Loan Retailer Branch
Similar to deposit retailer branches, we assume the loan retailer branches operate
under monopoly competition. The loan demands of each loan retailer branch
for enterprises and impatient households (indexed by j = E,H ) are bjt (i) =[
rbjt (i) /r
bj
t
]−εbj
bjt , where εbj is the elasticity of substitution of loan demand.
Loan retailer branches select loan interest rate to maximize their profit as follows:
max
rbjt (i)
E0
∞∑
t=0
ΛP0,t
rbEt (i) bEt (i)− rwEt bEt (i)− κbE2
(
rbEt (i)
rbEt−1 (i)
− 1
)2
rbEt b
E
t
+rbHt (i) b
H
t (i)− rwHt bEt (i)−
κbH
2
(
rbHt (i)
rbHt−1 (i)
− 1
)2
rbHt b
H
t
 (18)
where, ΛP0,t is random discount factor of patient households, κbE and κbH are
parameter of sticky extent. The first order conditions for rbEt (i) and r
bH
t (i)
yield, after imposing symmetric equilibrium,
1− εbj + εbj rwj
rbj
− κd
(
rbjt
rbjt−1
− 1
)
rbjt
rbjt−1
+ βPEt
[
λPt+1
λPt
κbj
(
rbjt+1
rbjt
− 1
)
rbjt+1
rbjt
bjt+1
bjt
]
= 0
(19)
In the steady state the loan interest is rbjt =
εbj
εbj−1r
wj
t . Because εbj > 0, the
loan interest rate is marked up to wholesale loan interest rate. Then, we can
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write the total profit of banking sector as
jbankt = r
bE
t (bA + bB) + r
bH
t b
I
t − rdt dt −
κkb
2
(
kwt
bt
− νb
)2
− η
2κw
(
mAt +m
B
t
) (
1 + rbEt
)
+ T
(
bAt
) (20)
3.4 The Rest of the Economy
3.4.1 Capital Goods Producer
Following Iacoviello (2005) and GNSS, we assume the capital goods producer
produces capital goods with a quadric adjustment cost, and then maximizes
profit as follows:
max
it(i)
E0
∞∑
t=0
ΛP0,t
[
qkt
[
1− κI
2
(
it
it−1
− 1
)2]
it − it
]
(21)
where, itis investment, Λ
P
0,t is random discount factor of patient households, κI
is the adjustment cost parameter. In our model, both state-owned and private
enterprises use homogenous capital, so the capital can be freely traded, which
means all capital goods have a unique capital goods price qkt . The first order
condition is:
1
qtk
= 1− κI
(
it
it−1
− 1
)
it
it−1
− κI
2
(
it
it−1
− 1
)2
+ βPκIEt
[
λPt+1
λPt
(
it+1
it
− 1
)
it+1
it
qkt+1
qkt
]
And the aggregated capital is kAt +k
B
t −(1− δ)
(
kAt−1 + kBt−1
)
=
[
1− κI2
(
it
it−1 − 1
)2]
it.
3.4.2 Retailer
In our model, the retailers combine the different products of two types of en-
terprises, by C-D technology yt =
(
yAt
)µy (
yBt
)1−µy
where, µy is the weight of
state-owned enterprises made products in total final goods. By maximization of
profit under cost constraint, we can derive
µy
1− µy =
yAt
yBt
xBt
xAt
(22)
We introduce the sticky price as (Calvo, 1983). Only γ of retailer may change
the price in each period, and then we can derive the New Keynes Philips Curve,
log
pit
p¯i
= βP log
pit+1
p¯i
− (1− γ) (1− βγ)
γ
[
µy log
xAt
x¯A
+ (1− µy) log x
B
t
x¯B
]
(23)
where, x¯ is steady state of the relative price of the final goods to intermediate
goods that is equal to the mark-up rate.
15
3.4.3 Market clear condition and Central bank
To close the model, we give the market clear condition for final goods as
yt = q
k
t
[
1− κI
2
(
it
it−1
− 1
)2]
it +
[
cAt + c
B
t + c
H
t + c
P
t
]
+
δbkwt−1
pi
+Adjt (24)
As to housing market, we assume the housing held by all households is equal
to an exogenous constant h¯, that is, hIt + h
P
t = h¯. The central bank follows the
standard Taylor rule,
log
1 + rt
r¯
= ρ log
1 + rt−1
r¯
+ (1− ρ)
[
φy log
yt
y¯t1
+ φpi log
pit
p¯i
]
+ εMPt (25)
where, ρ measures the continuity of monetary policy, φy and φy are the weights
assigned to inflation and output stabilization respectively, and r¯ is steady state
value of interest rate.
3.5 Calibration
In the previous subsection, we built the full DSGE model with discriminatory
credit constraint. In this subsection, we calibrate the structural parameters ac-
cording to related literature and China’s data, in order to analyse the impulse-
response figures of the main economic variables under technical shock and mon-
etary policy shock.
Table 1 shows the calibrated parameters which influence the steady state of
the model. We select Chinese average deposit benchmark interest rate as steady
state value of deposit interest rate. According to the steady state deposit interest
rate, we calibrate the objective discount factor of patient households as 0.9926.
For the discount factors of impatient households and of state-owned enterprises,
we follow GNSS to calibrate them as 0.975. Considering that private enterprises
are more motivated to enlarge production and borrow money, we calibrate their
discount factor as 0.0970, which means they are more impatient than state-owned
enterprises.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
We calibrate the steady state of LTV according to Chinese industrial firm data.
We use the total debt minus amount payable to calculate the long-term debt,
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and then use the long-term debt divided by total fixed assets to calibrate LTV
ratio. According to the data, we calibrate the LTV ratio of state-owned enter-
prises as 0.50, while the LTV ratio of private enterprises is only 0.46. As the
data of household loan is not available, we calibrate the LTV ratio of impatient
households as 0.7, the same as GNSS. According to the Commercial Bank Re-
port of the People’s Bank of China, the non-performing loan rate is around 1%,
so we calibrate the steady state loan default rate as equal to 0.01. Then we can
calculate the parameter of default cost for firm κf as 1.4279. We use Chinese
average loan benchmark interest rate as steady state value of loan interest rate to
firms, and choose 7-day Shanghai inter-bank offered rate (SHIBOR) as the proxy
of steady state value of Taylor Rule rate. There is an important assumption that
the steady state value of banks’ leverage ratio is equal to the requirement of 0.08
set by the central bank (similar to GNSS). According to these interest rates, we
can calibrate the parameter of CSV cost κw as 1, and we calibrate the substi-
tution elasticity of deposit market and loan market for enterprises in order to
match the steady state LTV ratio. With regard to the substitution elasticity of
the loan market for households, we follow GNSS to calibrate it as 2.79.
The depreciation rate of capital is calibrated as normal, 0.025, which means
10% per year. Values for the capital share in production function vary in the
literature, with Chinese scholars estimating it in a range between 0.3 and 0.6.
To describe the characteristic of investment-led growth of SOEs, we calibrate the
capital share of SOEs and PEs as 0.5 and 0.33 respectively. Following Gertler
and Karadi (2011) and GNSS , we calibrate the steady state of utilization of cap-
ital as 1, and calibrate the parameter of adjustment cost for capital utilization
as κu1 = 0.00478 and κ
u
2 = 0.0478 . Following the majority of studies, we cali-
brate the steady state mark-up rate in the goods market as 1.2, which matches
the substitution elasticity of 6. Considering that the private economy is grow-
ing rapidly and already occupies more than 60% of the GDP, we calibrate the
weight of SOE-produced goods as 0.4. Following GNSS, the share of impatient
households is calibrated as 0.2.
We calculate the management cost of bank capital as 0.0865. The subsidy to
banks for SOE loans is hard to calibrate. The steady state of marginal subsidy
rate κT2 can be calculated as 0.0004. As to the second order marginal subsidy
rate κT1 , we calibrate it as 0.02, and will test its range in the further analysis.
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Table 2 reports the calibration values of other parameters, which do not affect
steady state. We calibrate the parameter of sticky price γ as 0.75, which means
the enterprise has one chance to change their price a year. The parameters of
adjustment cost are calibrated according to GNSS posterior mean values. This
is for two reasons. First, Chinese financial architecture is bank-oriented, as is
the euro area, so their banking systems are similar to some extent. Secondly,
our model is based on the GNSS model, so the parameters may be more suitable
to show the mechanism of financial frictions. With regard to the coefficient of
Taylor rule, we calibrate the coefficient on inflation rate φpi as 1.5, while the
coefficient on output is 0.125, following Rannenberg (2013). Following GNSS,
we calibrate the continuity parameter of monetary policy ρ as 0.75.
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
4 Simulation and Discussion
In this section, we analyse the role of discriminatory credit constraint based on
the impulse responses of technology shocks and monetary policy shocks. By com-
paring results from the model with discriminatory credit constraint with those
from a model where the two types of enterprise have the same LTV ratio, we
find the impact of discriminatory credit constraint on the economy. We also ex-
plain the mechanism whereby it amplifies the technology shocks and hinders the
effectiveness of monetary policy. Finally, we focus on the source of discrimina-
tory credit constraint. When enlarging the parameter value of marginal subsidy
rate for SOE loans, we find that the impact of discriminatory credit constraint
decreases.
4.1 Technology Shock
Figure 6 describes the response fluctuations of the main macro-economic vari-
ables after one unit of negative technology shock. As a result of technology
decrease, both the production cost and the product price increase, leading to a
decline in consumption. While being aware that the technology shock is tempo-
rary, representative patient households may increase their current consumption
and diminish their deposit, causing the deposit supply to decrease. For impatient
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households and enterprises, their loan demand increases. Impatient households
would like to borrow more money to maintain their consumption, while enter-
prises would like to borrow money to smooth the influence of negative technology
shock. However, limited by equilibrium, the total loan decreases as deposit sup-
ply decreases, therefore causing the interest rate to increase. These results are
in line with existing literature.
FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE
In our model, endogenous LTV ratios and different treatment of SOEs and
PEs are described clearly. From Figure 6 we can see that under the situation
of discriminatory credit constraint, loan to SOE grows slightly, while loan to
PE falls significantly. This may be interpreted according to the different LTV
ratios. Both the LTV of SOEs and that of PEs is decreasing, which reveals that
the LTV of SOEs is counter-cyclical, while that of PEs is pro-cyclical. SOEs
have more power to influence the bank because of their strong background, so
the credit constraint they confront is less binding. However, PEs can only accept
the loan condition proposed by banks. As a consequence, more loan resources
flow to SOEs. Due to China’s special characteristics the financial market is not
perfect, leading to banks’ unfair treatment towards different types of enterprise.
In China, central and local government force banks to support SOEs with low
requirements for collateral, and may even vouch directly for the SOEs so that
they receive loans. These factors ensure that the loan direction is biased toward
SOEs.
Under the conditions of negative technology shock, discriminatory credit con-
straint can enlarge the fluctuation of output. By changing the parameters to
make the credit constraint of both types of enterprise the same, eliminating the
subsidy to banks for SOE loans, we can get another series of impulse responses
with no discrimination. From Figure 6, we can see that the growth of output
with no discriminatory credit constraint is slightly higher. This means that the
financial accelerator effect (KM type) is enlarged when the credit constraint is
discriminatory. When the economy deteriorates, banks tend to lower LTV ratio
to control the CSV cost. Due to the subsidy for SOE loans, banks only lower
the LTV ratio of PEs, but maintain or increase the LTV ratio of SOEs. The
relatively lower LTV ratio will induce a sharp decrease in capital demand. Be-
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cause SOEs and PEs use the same capital for investment, the capital prices are
influenced by capital demand of both types of enterprise.
As the figure shows, compared to the model with no discrimination, the
decrease of LTV for PEs has a greater influence on the capital price, making
it decrease further. This is due to resource misallocation. At the first time,
despite of the different LTV ratios, PEs and SOEs have almost the same profit
rate, and there is no misallocation. However, the borrowing constraints with
different binding extent lead to different operation situation of two types of
firms. With more binding borrowing constraint, PEs may only decrease loan and
investment, or even fire sale the capital, which induce to supply’s further decline.
Correspondingly, the supply of SOEs is less decreasing. Due to substitution
elasticity of demand between two types of firms, the demand structure cannot
change intermediately. Thus, SOEs’ profitability and capital return become lower
than PE’s. Contiguous enlargement of the loan gap between SOE and PE leads
to more severe misallocation, therefore causing aggregate capital price’s further
decline. Further decline of capital price makes both the borrowing constraints of
PEs and SOEs more binding, and causing aggregate output’s decline amplified.
As a consequence, discriminatory credit constraint set by banks sharpens the
decrease of capital price, and then the total collateral is less valuable, while the
total loan of enterprises declines further, thus leading to more decline of total
output.
Furthermore, discriminatory credit constraint may worsen the economic struc-
ture and sharpen the excess capacity of SOEs. From Figure 6, we can see that
the capital of SOEs increases, while that of PEs decreases, and the capital uti-
lization of SOEs decreases faster than that of PEs. This reflects the change of
economic structure and greater excess capacity of SOEs. As we know, SOEs in
China are less efficient, so their output growth relies on investment. Continu-
ous investment improves SOEs’ capacity of production, but the demand cannot
satisfy the supply. At the beginning of the 21st century, benefitting from the
trend of globalization, China’s exports increased rapidly, which supported the
excess capacity of manufacturing. However, after the global crisis of 2008, ex-
ternal demand decreased sharply, and the problem of excess capacity became
more important. Although our model cannot describe the results of economic
structure imbalance and excess capacity, we know that they are disincentives to
20
economic development.
4.2 Monetary Policy Shock
Figure 7 reports the impulse responses of the main macro-economic variables
under a standard deviation of expansionary monetary policy shock. As a result
of expansionary monetary policy, the deposit interest rate decreases, and then
households decrease deposits to increase current consumption. The growth of
aggregate demand stimulated by expansionary monetary policy causes output to
grow. For banks, decreasing policy interest rate makes them lower loan interest
rates, which leads to growth of total loan. These results are similar to those in
the related literature.
FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE
We pay further attention to the loans to different types of enterprise. Com-
pared with the model without discrimination, LTV ratio of SOEs decreases
slightly, but that of PE decreases more significantly. More loans flow to SOEs
rather than PEs. Due to the subsidy for SOEs, banks set relatively higher LTV
for SOEs, but lower LTV ratio for PEs, in order to lend more money to SOEs
and improve their profit. With a similar mechanism to the situation under
negative technology shocks, decreasing PEs’ LTV has a dramatic influence on
the capital price, as the figure shows. Total loan to enterprises decreases more
sharply, therefore leading to lower effectiveness of expansionary monetary policy
when stimulating output growth. Since expansionary monetary policy cannot
promote economic growth effectively, growing liquidity cannot flow to the real
economy, and then it flows to the housing market. Compared to the LTV ratios
for enterprises, LTV ratio for impatient households is higher and more fixed, as
household loan is less risky. When the real economy cannot absorb the liquidity
released by central banks, it is reasonable that the liquidity flows to households.
As a consequence, housing and real estate become more valuable due to their
collateral value, leading to growing housing demand and a prosperous housing
market. This is in line with China’s housing market boom since 2009.
Furthermore, in the model with discriminatory credit constraint SOEs con-
front the more serious problem of excess production capacity. This has the same
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mechanism as that under negative technology shocks. Banks’ unfair treatment
to different types of enterprise leads to different capital investment decisions
of SOEs and PEs. Having obtained financial support, SOEs implement more
capital assets investment. However, unsustainable growth of aggregate demand
cannot support fast growing supply, thus causing excess production capacity in
SOEs. This is also in line with the actual situation since 2009.
4.3 Further Analysis on Amplification Effect of Dis-
criminatory Credit Constraint
According to the above analysis on impulse response figures, we find that dis-
criminatory credit constraint has an amplification effect on the transmission of
negative technology shocks. In order to make clear the source of amplification
effect and how it changes according to the extent of discrimination, we further
examine the impulse response figures under different parameters of subsidy.
As the first order marginal subsidy rate κT2 is depends on the steady state
of LTV ratios of SOEs and PEs, we can adjust only the second order marginal
subsidy rate κT1 to change the extent of discrimination. As we can see from Figure
8, higher subsidy rate leads to relatively smaller amplification effect. This is due
to the double effect of subsidy. In fact, the subsidy for SOE loan has both income
effect and substitution effect on credit constraint and total loans to enterprises.
On one hand, when the government improves the marginal subsidy rate, the
banks may earn more income, and then they will properly lower the interest rate
(under negative technology shocks) and increase loan supply to maximize their
profit. This is income effect. On the other hand, when the government improves
the marginal subsidy rate, the banks are willing to lend more to SOEs rather
than PEs, and then they will set higher LTV for SOEs and lower LTV for PEs.
Resource misallocation makes the capital price decrease more sharply, leading
to decline of total loan to enterprises. This is substitution effect. With regard
to the total loan to enterprises, these two effects play opposite roles. Generally,
the substitution effect is more significant than the income effect, so we find
the amplification effect of discriminatory credit constraint. However, when we
further improve the marginal subsidy rate, the substitution effect changes less,
but income effect increases to some extent; therefore, the amplification effect is
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slightly weakened.
We can also find this mechanism through the equation of the gap between
LTV ratios. Under the assumption of the same loan default rate for all types of
enterprises, from Eq.(15) we can have the expression of gap of LTV ratios:
mAt = m
B
t +
κw
(
κT1
(
bAt /b¯
A − 1)+ κT2 )
η
(
1 + rbEt
) (26)
Where bAt is SOE loan, κ
T
1 and κ
T
2 are parameters of subsidy for SOE loan, r
bE
t is
the loan rate to enterprises. It is obvious that the gap of LTV ratio is positively
related with the two parameters of subsidy for SOE loan, and negatively related
with loan interest. When we increase the κT1 , under the condition of increasing
bAt , the numerator of the fraction at the right hand side of Eq.(26) also increases.
However, the income effect of increasing subsidy lowers the loan interest rbE,
decreasing denominator of the fraction, so we cannot judge the value of fraction
increases or decreases. Through the figure, we know generally the gap of LTV
ratios is positive related to the subsidy parameter κT1 , but the marginal effect is
negative related to the parameter.
FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE
5 Empirical Evidence from China
Finally, we analyse in detail the impact of discriminatory credit constraint on
transmission of technology shocks and monetary shocks. In this section, we em-
pirically test the robustness of the model result using data of Chinese industrial
firms. We focus our testing on two conclusions from the model analysis: first,
that the gap between LTV ratios of SOEs and PEs will be enlarged by expansion-
ary monetary policy; secondly, that loans flow more to SOEs than to PEs under
expansionary monetary policy shocks, due to discriminatory credit constraint.
5.1 Regression model
First, we build a benchmark regression model to analyse the factors influencing
the economic growth:
IAVi,t = β0 + β1TFPi,t + β2Intt + β3DCCi,t + β4Ni,t + µi + εi,t (27)
23
where, IAVi,t is logarithm of industrial added value of industry i in the year t, as
the proxy of economic growth, TFPi,t is logarithms of TFP of industry i in the
year t, measuring the technology level improvement, Intt is real interest rate of
year t , measuring the monetary policy, is the ratios of average SOE LTV ratio to
average PE LTV ratio in industry i in the year t, measuring the discrimination
extent of credit constraint, Ni,t is logarithm of employee numbers of industry
i in the year t, measure the labor3, µi and εi,t are fix effect and residual error
respectively.
We estimate TFP using Solow Residual Method (Barro, 1999; Felipe, 1999).
We first estimate the capital share of production function, under the assumption
of constant returns to scales by (28), and then calculate TFP by equation (29).
The two equations are as follows:
IAV toNi,t = β0 + αKtoNi,t + εi,t (28)
TFPi,t = IAVi,t − αˆKi,t − (1− αˆ)Ni,t (29)
where IAV toNi,t is the ratio of logarithm of industrial added value to logarithm
of employee numbers, KtoNi,t is the ratio of logarithm of capital assets to loga-
rithm of employee numbers, α is the capital share coefficient, αˆ is its estimated
value.
According to the conclusion above on discriminatory credit constraint drawn
by impulse response figures, following Fisman and Love (2003) we can build the
regression model as follows to examine the moderate effect of discriminatory
credit constraint:
IAVi,t = β0 + β1TFPi,t + β2Intt + β3DCCi,t
+β4 (DCCi,t × TFPi,t)β5Ni,t + µi + εi,t
(30)
where, (DCCi,t × TFPi,t) represents product items of TFP and the discrimina-
tion extent of credit constraint. Because the improvement of TFP may promote
economic growth, so β3 should be significantly positive. If coefficient β4 is also
significantly positive, it means the higher discrimination extent may amplify the
influence of TFP on industrial added value growth.
3We use capital and labour to estimated TFP by Solow Residual Method. Due to the co-linearity
problem, we select only two of the three variables included in the regression model.
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Similarly, in order to test moderate effect of discrimination extent on the ef-
fectiveness of monetary policy, we build another regression model with a product
term as follows:
IAVi,t = β0 + β1TFPi,t + β2Intt + β3DCCi,t
+β4 (DCCi,t × Intt)β5Ni,t + µi + εi,t
(31)
where, (DCCi,t × Intt) represents product items of Intt and the discrimination
extent of credit constraint. Because the industrial added value is negatively
related to interest rate, if coefficient β4 is significantly positive, it means the
higher discrimination extent may hinder the influence of monetary policy on
industrial added value growth.
5.2 Data Source and Description
The data set we use come from the China Annual Survey of Industrial Firms
from 1999 to 2008. First, we sort the firms according to whether they belong
to SOE or PE, and eliminate those firms with fewer than 8 employees in order
to ensure the firms’ existence and scale. Secondly, to maintain the effectiveness
of LTV ratio, we eliminate the firms with long-term debt and negative capital
assets, because we use the ratio of long-term debt to capital assets as the proxy
of LTV ratio. Moreover, we exclude the firms whose LTV ratio is bigger than 3,
to ensure a reasonable and suitable scale of firms. Following this procedure, we
have a sample with 397,069 observations. Thirdly, for the purpose of calculating
the discrimination extent of credit constraint, we aggregate the firms’ data to
industrial-level data. In the China Annual Survey of Industrial Firms, all firms
are classified into 39 industries, such as Coal Mining, Oil and Gas, and Textiles.
Taking all the factors into account, we obtain an industrial-level sample of 335
observations of 39 industries from 1999 to 2008.4. Finally, we estimate the TFP
of each industry in each year. As shown in the first column in Table 5, the
capital share is significant at 5% level, with a value of 0.790. It is marginally
bigger than other scholars’ estimated results, because for our model we select
industrial firms, which have a relatively higher capital share than the agriculture
4Due to the data availability, we cannot obtain the data covering the years from 2008 to 2014.
However, since discriminatory credit constraint is long-standing in China, the data from 1999 to 2008
can be used to examine its impact.
25
and public services industries. Then we calculate the TFP through Eq.(29).
The measurement and descriptive statistic of variables are reported in Table 3
and Table 4 respectively. The correlation analysis is not reported, and all the
correlation coefficients are smaller than the co-linearity threshold of 0.7 (Mason
et al., 1990).
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
5.3 Results and Analysis
5.3.1 Discriminatory Credit Constraint, TFP and Economic Growth
Table 5 reports the regression results. As shown in Table 5, Reg.(5) estimates
the model(30) using the Fix Effects method5. The coefficient of product item
DCCi,t × TFPi,t is 0.257 and significant at 5% level. This reveals that, in
industries where the extent of discrimination of credit constraint between SOE
and PE is higher, when TFP decreases, the growth rate of industrial added
value will decrease more dramatically. This is in line with our conclusion from
the model analysis. Discriminatory credit constraint can amplify the impact of
technology shock on total output.
The coefficient of TFP is significantly positive, and the coefficient of interest
rate is significantly negative, also in line with existing theory. Reg.(3) is the
benchmark estimation, which is the reference to regression models with prod-
uct items. All estimated coefficients are significant, and in line with existing
literature. The coefficient of DCCi,t is significantly negative, which shows that
discriminatory credit constraint is damaging to economic growth.
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
5.3.2 Monetary Policy and Loan Flow Direction
Table 5 also reports the regression results of Eq.(31). As shown in Reg.(5), the
coefficient of product item DCCi,t × Intt is 5.238 and significant at 5% level;
the coefficient of real interest rate is -27.70, significant at 1% level. According
5The Hausman test has been made for all panel regressions. All the results support the fixed effect
model.
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to our calculation of coefficients, we find that if the extent of discrimination
of credit constraint increases by 1 unit, when real interest rate decreases by 0.1
percentage points, the increase of industrial added value growth rate will decrease
by 0.5238 percentage points. That is, in industries where discriminatory credit
constraint between SOEs and PEs is greater, expansionary monetary policy will
be less effective in promoting economic growth. Therefore, discriminatory credit
constraint may hinder the effectiveness of expansionary monetary policy.
In Reg.(5), the estimated values of other coefficients are also significant, in
line with the benchmark model. For robustness, we also add the two product
items in regression at the same time. All the results are significant and consistent
with Reg.(4) and Reg.(5).
6 Conclusion Remarks
An increasing number of scholars have started to do research on the Chinese
banking sector and China’s business cycle. However, they pay little attention to
China’s economic slowdown, which has been continuous since 2012 and is actually
the sequel to the 2008 US crisis and China’s subsequent expansionary monetary
and fiscal policy. Some scholars believe the slowdown may be explained by the
global business cycle, while others argue that it could be the result of Chinese
economic structural imbalance. We find that discriminatory credit constraint
between SOEs and PEs is the essential factor accelerating China’s continuing
economic slowdown.
We extend the GNSS model with a bank sector limited by capital acquire-
ment, incorporating banks’ CSV cost and two types of enterprise. We find that
the endogenous LTV ratio of PEs is pro-cyclical, while that of SOEs is counter-
cyclical. From both theoretical and empirical analysis, we draw the following
conclusions. First, the benefit connections between government, SOEs and banks
constitute the main source of discriminatory credit constraint. Secondly, discrim-
inatory credit constraint can amplify the impact of technology shock on total
output. Thirdly, discriminatory credit constraint can hinder the effectiveness
of expansionary monetary policy. Finally, the discriminatory credit constraint
may also worsen the economic structure of SOEs and PEs, and may sharpen the
excess production capacity of SOEs.
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Our model can be used by further research on the impact of banks’ unfair
treatment towards firms of different scale or stock price, as well as in compari-
son of the different business cycles in countries with different types of financial
architecture, such as the euro area and the US.
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Figure 1: 2004Q1-2014Q3 China’s Year-on-Year GDP Growth Rate (%)
Data Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China
Figure 2: 2004-2013 Annual Growth Rate of China’s Middle & Long-Term Loan (%)
Data Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China
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Figure 3: Loan to Value Ratio of State-own and Private Industry firms in China
Data Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China
Figure 4: 2001.11-2013.09 Loan to Value Ratio of Industrial Enterprises and Industry
Growth
Data Source: Calculated based on data from National Bureau of Statistics of China.
Note: Due to lack of payables’ data, we use receivables as its proxy, so the loan to
value ratio is calculated as the differences of total debs and receivables, divided by
total assets. The black solid line is trend line of SOEs, while the red dash line is trend
line of PEs.
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Figure 5: Framework of the completed DSGE model
Data Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China
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Figure 6: The Amplification Effect of Discriminatory Credit Constraint on the Trans-
mission of a Negative Technology Shock
Note: All variables are shown as percentage deviation from steady state. The red line
is from model with discriminatory credit constraint, while the blue line is from model
without non-discriminatory credit constraint (No subsidy for SOE loan and the same
LTV steady state). The first eight figures are about macro variables. In the last four
figures, solid line and dotted line are expressed as SOE and PE respectively.
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Figure 7: The Weakening Effect of Discriminatory Credit Constraint on the Transmis-
sion of an Expansionary Monetary Policy Shock
Note: All variables are shown as percentage deviation from steady state. The red line
is from model with discriminatory credit constraint, while the blue line is from model
without non-discriminatory credit constraint (No subsidy for SOE loan and the same
LTV steady state). The first eight figures are about macro variables. In the last four
figures, solid line and dotted line are expressed as SOE and PE respectively.
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Figure 8: The Amplification Effect and Different Extent of Discrimination
Note: It is similar to Figure 6&7. Diamond red line is model with discriminatory credit
constrain and higher marginal subsidy rate (with κT1 = 0.05 , while in benchmark model
κT1 = 0.02 ).
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Table 1: Calibrated Parameters Influencing Steady State
Parameter Description Value
βP Discount factor of Patient households 0.9926
βI Discount factor of Impatient households 0.975
βA Discount factor of SOE 0.975
βB Discount factor of PE 0.97
m¯A Steady state LTV ratio for SOE 0.5
m¯B Steady state LTV ratio for PE 0.46
mH LTV ratio for Impatient households 0.7
η Steady State Loan Default rate 0.01
κw Parameter of default cost with LTV 1
κf Parameter of CSV cost with LTV ratios 1.4279
εd Substitution elasticity of Deposit market -3.3
εbH Substitution elasticity of Household Loan demand 2.79
εbE Substitution elasticity of Enterprises Loan demand 10.7128
δ Depreciation rate of capital 0.025
u¯ Steady state utilization rate of capital 1
αA Capital share of SOE 0.5
αB Capital share of PE 0.33
κu2 Parameter of adjustment cost for capital utilization 0.0478
κu1 Parameter of adjustment cost for capital utilization 0.00478
x¯ Steady state markup rate of goods market 1.2
µy Share of SOE-produced goods 0.4
µn Share of impatient household labor 0.2
δb Management cost of bank capital 0.0865
νb Capital acquirement rate 0.08
κT2 Parameter of Subsidy rate to SOE loan 0.0004
κT1 Parameter of Subsidy rate to SOE loan 0.02
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Table 2: Calibrated Parameters Not Influencing Steady State
Parameter Description Value
γ Price Stickiness 0.75
κbE Firm rate adjust. cost 10.22
κbH HH rate adjust. cost 3.63
κd Deposit rate adjust. cost 9.51
κf Invest. adjust. cost 10.26
κkb Leverage dev. cost 11.49
φpi T. R. coeff on pi 1.5
φy T. R. coeff on y 0.125
ρ T. R. Continuity 0.75
a Consumption habit 0.5
Table 3: Variables & Measurements
Variable Name Measurements Source
IAVi,t Output
Logarithm of aggregated industrial
added value
China Annual Survey of
Industrial Firms
Ni,t Labor Logarithm of aggregated employees
China Annual Survey of
Industrial Firms
Ki,t Capital Assets Logarithm of aggregated capital assets
China Annual Survey of
Industrial Firms
TFPi,t TFP Calculated by Eq. Estimated by this paper
Intt Monetary Policy Real interest rate WDI from Word Bank
DCCi,t
Discrimination
Extent
SOE average LTV / PE average LTV
China Annual Survey of
Industrial Firms
Note: LTV is calculated as aggregated long-term loans divided by aggregated capital assets.
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Table 4: Description of Variables
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max
IAVi,t 187 15.178 2.16 7.476 15.706 18.073
Ni,t 335 10.769 2.012 2.485 11.186 14.087
Ki,t 335 15.147 2.076 5.956 15.477 18.713
TFPi,t 187 0.874 0.52 -1.433 0.956 2.524
Intt 335 0.02 0.028 -0.023 0.025 0.072
DCCi,t 335 1.258 0.726 0.056 1.12 6.628
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Table 5: Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS FE FE FE FE FE
VARIABLES IAV toNi,t IAVi,t IAVi,t IAVi,t IAVi,t IAVi,t
KtoNi,t 0.790***
(0.0321)
TFPi,t 0.352*** 0.330*** 0.397*** 0.166* 0.198**
(0.0711) (0.071) (0.0753) (0.0961) (0.0934)
Intt -22.81*** -21.91*** -27.70*** -20.51*** -28.10***
(1.397) (1.444) (2.811) (1.528) (2.715)
DCCi,t -0.0874** -0.200*** -0.345*** -0.602***
(0.041) (0.0621) (0.112) (0.133)
DCCi,t × Inti,t 5.238** 7.348***
(2.193) (2.206)
DCCi,t × TFPi,t 0.257** 0.355***
(0.104) (0.105)
Ni,t 0.756*** 0.795*** 0.785*** 0.804*** 0.793***
(0.0363) (0.0402) (0.0398) (0.0397) (0.0385)
Constant 0.295*** 7.270*** 6.955*** 7.125*** 7.004*** 7.261***
(0.0463) (0.423) (0.443) (0.441) (0.435) (0.428)
Observations 187 187 187 187 187 187
R-squared 0.766 0.951 0.952 0.954 0.954 0.958
No. of Industry 39 39 39 39 39
Hausman Test (p Value) 0.0000 0.0005 0.0008 0.0023 0.0006
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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